Essence and Cause: Making Something Be What It Is by Sirkel, Riin
Di
s
c
i
p
l
i
n
e
 
F
i
l
o
s
o
f
i
c
h
e
X
X
V
I
I
I
1
2
0
1
8
A
n
c
i
e
n
t
 
O
n
t
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
.
 
C
o
n
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
 
D
e
b
a
t
e
s
Discipline
Filosofiche
XXVIII 1 2018
Ancient Ontologies.
Contemporary 
Debates
Edited by Riccardo Chiaradonna,
Filippo Forcignanò 
and Franco Trabattoni
Discipline Filosofiche  XXVIII 1 2018
Ancient Ontologies. Contemporary Debates
Edited by Riccardo Chiaradonna, Filippo Forcignanò 
and Franco Trabattoni
Sommario
Riccardo Chiaradonna, Filippo Forcignanò e Franco Trabattoni,
Presentazione • Francesco Fronterotta, “Do the Gods Play Dice?”. Sens -
ible Sequentialism and Fuzzy Logic in Plato’s Timaeus • Riccardo Chia -
radonna, Massimo Marraffa, Ontology and the Self: Ancient and Con-
temporary Perspectives • Gabriele Galluzzo, Are Matter and Form Parts?
Aristotle’s and Neo-Aristotelian Hylomorphism • Riin Sirkel, Essence
and Cause: Making Something Be What It Is • Marilù Papandreou,
Aristotle’s Hylomorphism and The Contemporary Metaphysics of Artefacts
• Gabriele De Anna, Substance, Form, and Modality • Maddalena
Bonelli, Dipendenza e indipendenza ontologica: la modernità della
posizione peripatetica • Enrico Postiglione, Aristotle on the Distribution
of Consciousness • Diego Zucca, Neo-Aristotelian Biofunctionalism •
Matteo Pietropaoli, L’οὐσία come presenza costante e l’esser vero come
autentico essere. Heidegger interprete di Aristotele, Metafisica Θ 10
ISSN 1591-9625 
ISBN 978-88-229-0221-4
Euro 20,00
Q
u
o
d
l
i
b
e
t Quodlibet
copertina disc. fil. 1-2018 2_Layout 1  03/05/18  11:52  Pagina 1
 Riin Sirkel 
Essence and Cause: Making Something Be What It Is 
Abstract: Essence and Cause: Making Something Be What It Is 
Aristotle frequently describes essence as a “cause” or “explanation” (Į੅ĲȚȠȞ or 
ĮੁĲȓĮ), thus ascribing to essence some sort of causal or explanatory role. This ex-
planatory role is often explicated by scholars in terms of essence “making the thing 
be what it is” or “making it the very thing that it is”. I argue that this is problematic, 
at least on the assumption that “making” expresses an explanatory relation, since it 
violates certain formal features of explanation (especially the requirement that the 
explanans be distinct from the explanandum). I then consider whether Aristotle is 
vulnerable to this problem by examining the explanatory role of essence in Posterior 
Analytics and Metaphysics Z 17. 
Keywords: Aristotle, Essence, Metaphysical Explanation, Demonstration, Form. 
Aristotle frequently describes essence as an Į੅ĲȚȠȞ or ĮੁĲȓĮ (“cause” or 
“explanation”), thus ascribing to essence a causal or explanatory role of 
some sort.1 The idea that essence plays some sort of causal or explanatory 
role has recently received increasing attention both in Aristotelian scholar-
ship and in contemporary metaphysics. This might be part and parcel of a 
more general move away from the modal approach to some of the central 
metaphysical issues such as dependence and essence. In contemporary 
metaphysics, the key text is Kit Fine’s “Essence and Modality” (1994), 
which challenges the modal conception of essence, i.e. the conception of an 
essential attribute as one that an object has necessarily (if it exists). Fine ar-
gues that if an attribute is essential to an object, then the object has the at-
tribute necessarily (if it exists), but that the converse need not always hold. 
Similar views on essence have been ascribed to Aristotle, with several au-
 
1 See An. Post. B 11, 94a 20-21; Met. A 3, 983a 27-28; ǻ 8, 1017b 15-16; Z 17, 1041a 9, 27-
28; H 2, 1043a 2-4; H 3, 1043b 12-14; etc. The terms Į੅ĲȚȠȞ and ĮੁĲȓĮ are usually used inter-
changeably, though some authors have proposed that the former is used for something that 
plays the role of a cause, and the latter for the role or manner of being a cause. See Casals, 
Reynés 1995. In what follows, I will use them interchangeably. Further, as several authors have 
noted, “cause” is not restricted to the modern notion of (efficient) cause, but extends more 
widely to “explanation”, i.e. what answers the relevant kind of “why”-question. See, e.g., Hol-
cutt 1974. In what follows, I will take “cause” and “explanation” to be equivalent. 
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thors emphasizing that an essential attribute for Aristotle is not just a neces-
sary attribute. For one thing, essence is intimately bound up with the 
“What is it?” (Ĳȓ ਥıĲȚ) question; for another, essence is explanatory (see, 
esp., Kung 1977; Cohen 1978a; and Witt 1989, ch. 6). The latter proposal 
has become dominant in recent scholarship, where the explanatory role of 
essence is often explicated in terms of essence “making the thing be what it 
is” or “making it the very thing that it is”. 
In this paper, I will argue that this way of explicating the explanatory 
role of essence is problematic, at least on the assumption that “making” ex-
presses a relation of metaphysical explanation. In section 1, I will examine 
some examples of how “making” terminology is used in recent scholarship, 
and show that the attempt to cash out the explanatory role of essence in 
terms of “making the thing be what it is” violates certain formal features of 
explanation, especially the requirement that the explanans be distinct from 
the explanandum. In sections 2 and 3, I will consider whether Aristotle is 
vulnerable to this problem by examining the explanatory role of essence in 
Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics Z 17. I will argue that, for Aristotle, es-
sence explains why a thing has certain other necessary attributes, and why 
matter constitutes a thing of a given kind. Yet these ways of explicating its 
explanatory role do not run into similar difficulties, since in these cases 
there is a distinction between explanans and explanandum. 
1. Essence and “making” 
To illustrate the use of “making” terminology in Aristotelian scholar-
ship, I will focus on two recent interpretations of Aristotle, viz. those by 
David Bronstein (2016) and Michail Peramatzis (2011).2 The authors deal 
with different subject matter – Bronstein with Aristotle’s account of scien-
tific knowledge in Posterior Analytics and Peramatzis with his account of 
ontological priority in Metaphysics – but both rely on the “causal-
explanatory model of essence” (as Peramatzis calls it), explicated in terms 
of essence “making the thing [be] what it is” or “making it [be] the very 
thing that it is”. Bronstein and Peramatzis stand out among other authors in 
that they make systematic use of the “making” terminology, placing the 
causal-explanatory model of essence at the center of their respective inter-
pretations. Further, Peramatzis and Bronstein treat “making” as expressing 
a relation of metaphysical explanation. This is presumably not the only way 
to understand “making” in connection with essence, but it makes their in-
 
2 See also Charles 2000. Peramatzis’ and Bronstein’s interpretations can be seen as further 
developments of the sort of interpretation developed by Charles. 
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terpretations relevant also in light of recent interest in metaphysical expla-
nation in contemporary metaphysics.3 Since they offer little explanation as 
to how precisely the expression “making something be what it is” should be 
understood, our best starting point is to look at some examples of its use. 
Peramatzis says the following: 
For instance, Socrates’ essence is to be a human, while Bucephalus’ essence is to 
be a horse. Similarly, the essence of the type human is what-it-is-to-be human. […] 
The essence, being human, is intuitively conceived as being somehow prior to the 
token- or type-object it is the essence of. One way to flesh out this idea is to think 
that what-it-is-to-be-human, the referent of “being human”, makes Socrates or the 
species human what they essentially are. But the converse is not true (Peramatzis 
2011, p. 4). 
However, it is clear that particular compounds such as Socrates and Callias have 
token-matter from which they are (partly) constituted, while universal compounds 
such as human or horse include type-matter amongst their components. It seems 
plausible that the essence and primary substance of compounds, their form, should 
be essentially and definitionally prior not only to them but also to their material 
components. […] [It] causes token- or type-materials and particular or universal 
compounds to be as they are. In this way, it explains their nature (Peramatzis 2011, 
pp. 177-178). 
Bronstein says the following: 
[N]on-demonstrative scientific knowledge consists in knowing (a) that E, which 
is the essence and thus the (formal) cause of S, is the cause because of which S is the 
very thing that it is and (b) that S is the very thing that it is by necessity. (For exam-
ple, we have non-demonstrative scientific knowledge of the species human being 
when we know that being a two-footed tame animal, human being’s essence (let’s 
suppose), is the cause because of which human being is the very thing that it is and 
that human being is the very thing that it is by necessity (Bronstein 2016, p. 8). 
 
3 A closer analysis of the way different scholars use the “making” terminology might reveal 
that there is a cluster of ideas associated with it, and that not all authors relate it to an explana-
tory relation. It is not my task to take up this analysis here, but I will mention two possible 
ideas. First, essence is often taken to play a classificatory role. One could thus propose that es-
sence “makes something be what it is” in that it classifies it in accordance with its natural kind. 
Nonetheless, classifying is not the same as explaining (by classifying something as x, essence 
does not explain why it is x), although there might be a connection between the classificatory 
and explanatory roles, e.g. essence explains why something is classified the way it is. See Witt 
1989, ch. 4, who criticizes the “standard interpretation” that the most important role of es-
sence is to explain species membership. Second, essence is often taken to be constitutive of a 
thing. Again, constitution is not the same as explanation, though they might be connected. See 
Tierney 2001, who develops an account of essence that distinguishes between explanation and 
constitution. In contemporary metaphysics, metaphysical explanation is usually discussed in 
connection with grounding. See, esp., Trogdon 2013; Jenkins 2013; and Thompson 2016b. 
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Definitions, like demonstrations, express explanations, but in a different way: if 
E is the essence of S, then E is the cause that makes S the very thing it is (Bronstein 
2016, p. 57). 
These passages suggest that “making” expresses some sort of explana-
tory relation: the claim that “essence makes the thing be what is it (or the 
very thing it is)” is equivalent to claims such as “the thing is what it is be-
cause of essence” and “essence explains why the thing is what it is”. It 
should be pointed out that Aristotle himself does not employ terms that 
could be translated as “making” (e.g. ʌȠȚİ૙Ȟ) in connection with essence.4 
But he does say that essence is an Į੅ĲȚȠȞ or ĮੁĲȓĮ, and that an Į੅ĲȚȠȞ answers 
a certain “why”-question (Phys. B 3, 194b 19), where a “why”-question is a 
request for an explanation. The use of “making” terminology by scholars 
can be seen as an attempt to further explicate the idea that essence is an 
Į੅ĲȚȠȞ and answers a certain “why”-question. According to Peramatzis and 
Bronstein, the “why”-question that essence serves to answer is “Why is the 
thing what it is (or the very thing that it is)?” 
It is reasonably clear from the above passages that the sort of explana-
tion that Bronstein and Peramatzis are interested in is metaphysical, not just 
epistemological. Epistemological explanation is more familiar: we explain 
something in order to better understand it. Metaphysical explanation, on 
the other hand, is a matter of how things are in the world: something in the 
world explains something else. These types of explanation may overlap, for 
one could say that explanations, if they are to increase our understanding, 
should track or express explanatory relations in the world. But insofar as 
Bronstein and Peramatzis are concerned with the explanatory role of es-
sence, they are concerned with metaphysical explanation, a worldly relation 
holding between worldly entities.5 
This way of understanding the relation between essence and its bearer is 
different from another way of thinking about their relationship that has 
been a commonplace in Aristotelian scholarship and that we may call the 
“identity model of essence”. On this model, the subject of an essential 
predication is identical with the predicate, so that the copula of an essential 
predication should be thought of as the identity sign. In modern scholar-
ship, this model was popularized by G.E.L. Owen (1965), who argues that 
 
4 Aristotle uses “making” terminology in connection with efficient cause: “[…] the maker 
(Ĳઁ ʌȠȚȠ૨Ȟ) [is the primary source of change and rest] of what is made” (Phys. B 3, 194a 29-31; 
Met. ∆ 1, 1013a 32). 
5 This implies that the sort of relation “making” expresses is not the same as “truth-
making”, which connects worldly entities with true statements: essence does not just make the 
statement about what a thing is true, but it makes the thing itself be what it is. 
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Aristotle adopts the identity model of essence in response to problems with 
the Third Man Argument.6 This model is often seen as the best way to ex-
plicate Aristotle’s claims to the effect that the subject of an essential predi-
cation is no other than, or the same as, the predicate (e.g. Top. A 9, 103b 
35-39; An. Post. A 22, 83a 24-35; Met. Z 6). Here we will set aside the ques-
tion of whether Aristotle really operates with two models of essence (and if 
so, how they are related). But it is important to emphasize that the explana-
tory relation is of a different kind than the identity relation, and so the ex-
planatory relation between the thing and its essence should not be reduced 
to or understood in terms of identity. 
The difference between explanation and identity becomes clear when 
we consider their formal features. Most importantly, explanation is gener-
ally taken to be irreflexive and asymmetrical, which means that nothing ex-
plains itself (explanation should not take the form of “x explains x”) and 
that explanation only runs in one direction and not the other (if x explains 
y, then y does not explain x).7 Identity, by contrast, is symmetrical (if x is 
identical to y, then y is identical to x) and reflexive (everything is identical 
with itself). The upshot is that where there is explanation, there would not 
be identity. While these formal features distinguish the explanatory relation 
that “making” expresses from identity, they also cause trouble for the 
causal-explanatory model of essence. Specifically, asymmetry and irreflexiv-
ity together imply that the relata of the explanatory relation must be distinct 
from each other: if x explains y, then x cannot be identical with y. In other 
words, there is no explanation whose explanandum and explanans is a single 
thing (where “thing” should be understood generally to include entities 
from any ontological category). It is this feature of explanation that reveals 
a difficulty with cashing out the explanatory role of essence in terms of es-
sence “making the thing be what it is”. 
In the case of essence making the thing be what it is, it is not obvious 
what the relevant distinction between explanans and explanandum is sup-
posed to be. This becomes clearer when we consider that “essence” is a 
translation of various expressions of Aristotle, including Ĳȓ ਥıĲȚ, “what it is”, 
 
6 Owen builds upon the diagnosis of the argument offered by Vlastos (1954), who pro-
poses that it relies on the “self-predication assumption” (SP) and the “non-identity assump-
tion” (NI). Owen holds that reflection on the Third Man Argument led Aristotle to deny SP 
for accidental predications, and NI for essential predications. Since to deny non-identity is to 
assert identity, we have an explanation as to why Aristotle holds that the copula of an essential 
predication is identity. This line of argument is further elaborated by Woods 1975. The iden-
tity conception of essence is also accepted (though not for the same reasons) by Cohen 1978b; 
Code 1985; Bostock 2004, etc. 
7 For discussion of the asymmetry of explanation, see Schnieder 2015. Cf. Thompson 2016a. 
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and ੖ʌİȡ ਥıĲȚ, “just what it is” or “the very thing it is”.8 But if essence 
makes the thing be what it is, and “essence” can be substituted with “what 
the thing is”, then aren’t we saying that what the thing is makes it be what it 
is? The explanandum is what the thing is and the explanans seems to be the 
same thing.9 Let us consider a more concrete example by Bronstein: “[…] 
being a two-footed tame animal, human being’s essence (let’s suppose), is 
the cause because of which human being is the very thing that it is” (Bron-
stein 2016, p. 8). The idea seems to be that the essence of the species hu-
man, e.g. two-footed tame animal, makes human the very thing it is, viz. 
two-footed tame animal. Here too the distinction is not obvious: what gets 
explained is human’s being a two-footed tame animal and what does the 
explaining seems to be the same thing. Relatedly, one might worry about 
the irreflexivity of explanation. If the essence of a thing is identical with the 
thing itself, then the irreflexivity of explanation is violated, since now the 
thing is explained in a circular fashion in terms of itself. 
How could one respond to this difficulty? Here I will consider a re-
sponse that is implicit in some of the claims and distinctions that Peramat-
zis makes, and that could be ascribed to Bronstein too. Peramatzis presup-
poses a distinction between “objects and types of objects” and “features, at-
tributes, ways or modes of being” (Peramatzis 2011, p. 3). The former cate-
gory includes particular things and their species and genera, e.g. Socrates 
and the species human. Under the latter category fall accidental attributes, 
as well as essences and forms – these too are attributes or modes of being. 
Similarly, Bronstein (2016, pp. 45-46; 76; 83) emphasizes that Aristotle re-
lies on a basic distinction between subjects and attributes, and associates es-
sences with attributes belonging to species and genera (“subject-kinds”). 
Potential worries aside, let us grant the distinction, noting that it is very 
common among scholars and metaphysicians alike to think of essence as an 
attribute (or a bundle of attributes) or an attribute-like entity.10 In light of 
 
8 It also translates “Ƞ੝ıȓĮ of something”. As Menn (2001, p. 89) emphasizes, what “the 
Ƞ੝ıȓĮ of X” means is “the answer to the question ‘Ĳȓ ਥıĲȚ X?’”: Ƞ੝ıȓĮ is the nominalization of 
this question. 
9 Here and in what follows, I will use “same” and “identical” interchangeably, but this is 
not the only way to understand sameness. See, e.g., Peramatzis 2014, who distinguishes iden-
tity from essential sameness. Presumably, explanations can hold between two items, which are 
non-identical, yet essentially the same. Thanks to Michail Peramatzis for pointing this out. 
10 One worry might be that Aristotle holds (see Cat. 5) that things predicated of subjects can 
also figure as subjects of predication (though not as ultimate subjects). So, it does not seem to be 
the case that everything falls either under one category or the other. Thanks to Stephen Menn for 
pointing this out. Further, the view that essence is an attribute or property is not accepted by eve-
ryone, e.g. Witt (1989, ch. 4) argues against it, and the sort of view that treats essence as a distinct 
entity (whether an attribute or something else) is rejected by Lowe (2013, ch. 6). 
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this, the distinction between explanans and explanandum would appear to 
be a category distinction: the explanans involves an attribute and the ex-
planandum involves an object to which the attribute belongs. Accordingly, 
one could propose that essence is an attribute that makes the thing be a 
thing with that attribute. 
Nonetheless, without further explanation, this proposal involves some 
difficulties. To start with, it is not clear how the attribute could, by itself, 
explain anything about the object. Consider the explanation for why the 
species human is human, or, equivalently, why the attribute of being human 
belongs to the species human. It seems that merely naming the attribute (as 
in “the attribute of being human belongs to human because of the attribute 
of being human”) does not suffice to explain this fact because it does not 
have the right kind of structure to serve as explanans. This sort of worry 
helps to explain why in recent discussions metaphysical explanation is typi-
cally taken to relate facts, where a fact consists of both an object and an at-
tribute. 
Now, one might wonder whether Aristotle takes the explanans to be a 
fact, for he speaks of essence (or form, or middle term) as an Į੅ĲȚȠȞ or ĮੁĲȓĮ. 
However, this might be just a figure of speech, for we will see in the follow-
ing sections that his more detailed discussions of explanation in Posterior 
Analytics and Metaphysics Z 17 suggest that explanans and explanandum 
have structure, and proceed in terms of statements of the form “P belongs 
to S” or “S is P”.11 Thus, he seems to acknowledge that appealing to an at-
tribute alone (or to a subject alone) does not yet allow us to raise or re-
spond to a “why”-question; we have to consider both together. Accord-
ingly, if “making” expresses an explanatory relation, we would have to as-
sume that the talk of essence (in “essence makes the thing be what it is”) is 
a shorthand for a thing’s having an essence, or however we characterize the 
relation between the thing and its essential attribute. However, if the rele-
vant explanans is a thing’s having an attribute, then we face similar worries 
about circularity: we seem to be saying that a thing’s having an attribute 
explains why the thing has that very attribute. For example, why is human 
human? Because it is human.12 
 
11 The proposal that an attribute by itself could play a causal-explanatory role makes more 
sense if we think of it as the cause of an effect. If we think of it as providing an explanation, 
then this proposal makes less sense. That explanation concerns facts is a common assumption 
among contemporary metaphysicians (see n. 3 for citations), and it is also defended by some 
scholars, especially those who explicitly focus on explanation in Aristotle. See, e.g., Holcutt 
1974, esp. p. 391. 
12 Admittedly, this example better comports with Bronstein’s view, given that for him it is 
subject-kinds (e.g. the species human being) that are made what they are by their essences. For 
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Alternatively, one might propose that an appropriate answer to the 
question “Why is human human?” is “Because it is a two-footed tame ani-
mal” or however the attribute of being human is defined. On this proposal, 
the attribute belongs to a subject because the essence of the attribute be-
longs to it. Nonetheless, this proposal does not escape worries about circu-
larity either, for we are still not dealing with distinct facts, but substituting 
one fact with an identical fact. Indeed, Peramatzis (2011, 1.1) admits as 
much, holding that essences themselves have essences, but the relation be-
tween essence and its essence is not explanation but identity. He defines the 
attribute of being human as “being a rational soul embodied in a certain 
type of organic body” and emphasizes that the latter does not make the at-
tribute be what it is: “Rather, the former is identical with the latter. The de-
finiendum- and definiens-phrases pick up one and the same (numerically) 
mode of being” (Peramatzis 2011, p. 5).13 This sort of view helps to avoid 
infinite regress: if essence makes the thing what it is, and essence itself is 
made what it is by its (distinct) essence, etc., then explanations would never 
terminate, which is not Aristotle’s view (see An. Post. A 3). However, if S’s 
being G explains S’s being F but G=F, then we are still dealing with a single 
fact, rather than with two distinct facts, one of which explains the other. The 
initially proposed explanation might be appealing to us because it increases 
our understanding of what being human amounts to, so it might be a success-
ful epistemological explanation, but it is not a metaphysical explanation.14 
What should we conclude from this? At the very least it follows that one 
should be more careful in characterizing the explanatory role of essence, 
and consider whether the expression “essence makes something be what it 
is” offers the most plausible explication of it. However, it does not follow 
that we should give up on the explanatory role of essence altogether. Ac-
cording to both Bronstein and Peramatzis, essence not only explains why 
something is what it is, but it also explains why a thing has certain other, 
non-essential attributes. This gives us another way of thinking about the 
explanatory role of essence that is widely acknowledged in the scholarship, 
 
Peramatzis, it is particular substances, their species and genera, as well as their matter that are 
made what they are by their forms or essences. 
13 For a similar proposal in contemporary metaphysics, see Correia, Skiles 2017, and Dorr 2017. 
14 We encounter similar worries also in connection with another possible proposal. One 
might ask “Why is human a two-footed tame animal?” and respond “Because this is essential 
to human”. This kind of view on metaphysical explanation is proposed by Glazier 2017. Yet, 
here too the proposed explanation does not seem to be metaphysical but epistemological: we 
are not dealing with distinct facts, although it may increase our understanding to learn that be-
ing a two-footed tame animal is essential to human. 
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and plays a dominant role in Aristotle’s Organon, viz. that essence explains 
why a thing has certain other significant attributes. 
2. The explanatory role of essence in Posterior Analytics 
The proposal that essence (or more precisely, a thing’s having an es-
sence) explains why the thing has certain other attributes does not run into 
similar difficulties as the proposal that essence explains why the thing is 
what it is. Even if essence is a certain kind of attribute (or a bundle of at-
tributes), the explanandum remains different from the explanans: some-
thing’s having essential attributes explains (not why the thing has these very 
attributes but) why it has other kinds of attributes. It is widely agreed that, 
for Aristotle, essential attributes explain the presence of other necessary but 
non-essential attributes, commonly referred to as propria.15 Aristotle intro-
duces the distinction between essence and proprium in Topics A 5: “A pro-
prium (੅įȚȠȞ) is something that does not reveal the essence, though it be-
longs to that subject alone and is convertibly predicated of it. It is a pro-
prium of humans, for example, to be capable of literacy; for if one is a hu-
man, then one is capable of literacy, and if one is capable of literacy, then 
one is a human” (102a 18-22). This characterization is not given in modal 
terms, but it has modal implications: what is predicated convertibly with its 
subject cannot belong to some other kind of subject (102a 23-30). Thus, 
propria belong to their subjects of necessity, e.g. nothing can be human 
without being capable of literacy, and conversely. 
A proprium is also characterized in Topics E as an attribute that “always 
accompanies” (ਕİ੿ ʌĮȡİʌȩȝİȞȠȞ, 131a 27; 131b 2) or “always follows” (ਕİ੿ 
ʌĮȡĮțȠȜȠȣșȠ૨Ȟ, 131b 9) or “follows always and necessarily (ਥȟ ਕȞȐȖțȘȢ)” 
(131b 24; 1294). These claims confirm that propria belong to their subjects 
of necessity, but they also tell us something about the relationship between 
propria and essence. Although propria are not part of the essence and defi-
nition of their subjects, they can be seen as following from the essence and 
definition – they are among the “necessary consequences” (ਥȟ ਕȞȐȖțȘȢ 
ਕțȩȜȠȣșȐ, 112a 17). For example, it is a necessary consequence of being ra-
tional that humans are capable of literacy. If we ask what this consequence 
relation amounts to, then the answer suggesting itself is that we are dealing 
here with an explanatory relation. That is, essential attributes explain why 
 
15 See Kung 1977, who takes an essential attribute’s being explanatory in this way to be 
“an indispensable feature of Aristotle’s view” (Kung 1977, p. 361). See also Shields 2007, pp. 
104-105; Koslicki 2012; Gorman 2014. For a list of authors defending a similar view in the 
context of Aristotle’s account of demonstrative knowledge in Posterior Analytics, see n. 22. 
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the thing has other necessary but non-essential attributes, e.g. human ra-
tionality explains why humans are capable of literacy. The “why”-question 
that the explanation serves to answer may be formulated thus: Why is S F? 
Because S is G. For example, why are humans capable of literacy? Because 
they are rational. 
This sort of explanatory relation is often taken to play a central role in 
Aristotle’s theory of demonstration (ਕʌȩįİȚȟȚȢ), as presented in Posterior 
Analytics.16 Demonstration is a special kind of deduction (“scientific deduc-
tion”, A 2 71b 17), consisting of premises and a conclusion that have a sub-
ject-predicate form, where the predicate term stands for something that be-
longs to a subject (let us call it an “attribute”), and the subject term for 
something to which the attribute belongs. We may thus say that demonstra-
tions proceed in terms of predications that correspond to facts, consisting 
of things and attributes belonging to those things.17 Aristotle holds that we 
have scientific knowledge of something without qualification (ਥʌȚıĲȒȝȘ 
ਖʌȜ૵Ȣ) when we know its explanation (ĮੁĲȓĮ), and we know that it is neces-
sary (A 2, 71b 9-12). Demonstration yields this kind of knowledge of the 
conclusion (or more precisely, of the fact stated in the conclusion) by prov-
ing that the conclusion holds and by explaining why it holds. 
Our focus will be on the sort of explanation that a demonstration pro-
vides. To begin with, it should be noted that a demonstration does not re-
veal the explanation by deducing it as a conclusion: the conclusion does not 
state the explanation, but the fact to be explained. It is the premises that 
display the explaining facts; more precisely, it is the middle term common 
to both premises that picks out the Į੅ĲȚȠȞ (see A 13). So we can say, though 
it would be a simplification, that a demonstration explains why a certain at-
tribute belongs to a subject via the third factor, viz. the middle term linking 
the subject and predicate terms: S is P because S is M and M is P.18 From 
this it follows that to be a genuine explanandum is to be expressed by a 
predication composed of subject and predicate terms that are not immedi-
ately linked, and so we can search for the middle term that explains why 
they are linked. This helps to clarify why Aristotle holds (B 3-7) that the at-
 
16 See, esp., Koslicki 2012, who argues that the consequence relation between essential 
truths and derived necessary truths is given by Aristotle’s technical concept of “demonstra-
tion”. 
17 For further discussion, see McKirahan 1992, ch. 2. 
18 Aristotle holds that demonstrations are, paradigmatically, deductions in Barbara, 
though he does not seem to think that all demonstrations are so (as the above formulation 
might suggest). Further, the major premise of a demonstration thus construed is problematic 
(viz. it stands itself in need of further explanation). For discussion of this problem, see Fere-
john 2013, 4.6. 
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tributes that can be demonstrated to belong to things figuring as subjects 
do not include essential attributes of the subject. For example, we cannot 
demonstrate that human is rational (assuming that being rational is essential 
to it), since here the connection between the subject and attribute is primi-
tive and immediate, i.e. it is not mediated by anything else, and so admits of 
no demonstration.19 
What, then, can be explained through a demonstration? It is reasonably 
clear Aristotle takes demonstrable attributes to include what he in Topics 
calls propria, i.e. the necessary but non-essential attributes. His favorite ex-
ample of a demonstrable truth in Posterior Analytics A is a triangle having 
angles equal to two right angles (2R), where having 2R belongs to a triangle 
of necessity without belonging in the essence and definition of a triangle.20 
What plays the role of the middle term and so does the explanatory work in 
such demonstrations is the essence of the subject, e.g. having 2R belongs to 
triangle because triangle is essentially thus-and-so, and whatever is essen-
tially thus-and-so has 2R.21 In such cases, demonstrations reveal explana-
tions of why things of a certain kind have non-essential attributes (specifi-
cally, propria) on the basis of the essence and definition of the subject-kind 
in question.22 
In Posterior Analytics B Aristotle’s stock examples of demonstrable at-
tributes are the eclipse of the moon and thunder, which he describes in A 8 
as “things that come about often” (ʌȠȜȜȐțȚȢ ȖȚȞȠȝȑȞȦȞ, 75b 33). We might 
think of these sorts of things as events or processes, but Aristotle seems to 
think of them as attributes (or whatever it is that corresponds to predicate 
terms) belonging to subjects, where the relevant subject in the case of 
eclipse is the moon, and in the case of thunder clouds. Accordingly, we can 
 
19 This is connected to Aristotle’s view that demonstrations cannot go on ad infinitum or 
in a circle, but must have first principles (including definitions) which are indemonstrable (see 
An. Post. A 3). 
20 Aristotle makes it clear in An. Post. A 5 (74a 35-b 4) that having 2R belongs to a triangle 
qua a triangle, and the qua requirement implies convertibility. So, having 2R fits with the de-
scription of a proprium in Top. A 5. On this, see Ferejohn 2013, pp. 118-120. See also Met. ¨ 
30 (1025a 30-34). 
21 For a reconstruction of this kind of demonstration, see Ferejohn 2013, p. 115. 
22 The view that demonstrations are explanatory in this way is accepted by most authors. 
See esp. Bronstein 2016, Ferejohn 2013, Koslicki 2012, Goldin 1996, Kung 1977. Cf. McKira-
han 1992, ch. 9, who holds that demonstrations explicate truths contained in definitions, so 
definitions contain all essential and necessary truths about the thing. This view is further de-
veloped by Tierney, who argues that essence does not explain necessary attributes but consists 
of them, and demonstration is not an explanation, but a “logico-deductive unpacking of essen-
tial natures” (Tierney 2001, p. 154). For a critical discussion of such views, see Goldin 1996, 
esp. pp. 4-5. 
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explain through demonstrations why such attributes belong to the subject, 
e.g. why being eclipsed (or suffering from a privation of light) belongs to 
the moon. Such demonstrations are also based on essences, although the es-
sence in question does not appear to be immediately the essence of the sub-
ject but rather the essence of the attribute, e.g. being eclipsed belongs to 
the moon because of its being screened by the earth, and being screened by 
the earth is part of what being eclipsed is.23 
Aristotle seems to have cases like this in mind when he says in Posterior 
Analytics B 2: “In all these cases, it is clear that what it is (Ĳȓ ਥıĲȚ) and why it 
is (įȚ੹ Ĳȓ ਩ıĲȚȞ) are the same. What is eclipse? A privation of light from the 
moon by the screening of the earth (ıĲȑȡȘıȚȢ ĳȦĲઁȢ ਕʌઁ ıİȜȒȞȘȢ ਫ਼ʌઁ ȖોȢ 
ਕȞĲȚĳȡȐȟİȦȢ). Why is there eclipse, or rather why is the moon eclipsed? Be-
cause the light is absent when the earth is screening” (90a 14-18). In B 10 
(94a 4-7), he makes a similar claim about thunder. 
In these cases, a demonstration that explains why an attribute belongs to 
a subject also reveals the essence and definition of the attribute. For exam-
ple, a demonstration that explains why the moon is eclipsed also answers 
the question “What is eclipse?”: eclipse is the privation of light from the 
moon by the screening of the earth. This does not mean that we are demon-
strating what an attribute is: what is demonstrated is an attribute’s belong-
ing to the subject, not its essence. But we can arrive at the definition of the 
attribute by rearranging the components of a demonstration (B 10, 94a 1-
4): the middle term explaining why the moon is eclipsed will be the de-
finiens of the resultant definition of being eclipsed. 
According to Peramatzis (2011, 7.8) and Bronstein (2016, esp. 7.6), Ar-
istotle’s examples of eclipse and thunder illustrate the causal-explanatory 
model of essence, according to which essence makes something be what it 
is. They emphasize that the definitions of eclipse and thunder have an ex-
plicitly explanatory component, e.g. eclipse is the loss of light from the 
moon because of the screening of the moon by the earth.24 The idea seems 
to be that the definiens (following the “because”-clause) corresponds to the 
essence that explains why the definiendum is what it is, e.g. the moon’s be-
ing screened by the earth explains why being eclipsed is what it is. None-
 
23 This need not mean that there is no connection between the essence of the subject and 
that of the attribute. Bronstein (2016, ch. 3) argues that these attributes belong to the subject 
because of the attribute’s essence. But since the attribute’s essence belongs to the subject be-
cause of the subject’s essence, the attribute belongs to the subject ultimately because of the 
subject’s essence. 
24 According to Bronstein (2016, p. 97), these definitions have the form “A-C because of 
B”. More specifically, it is the B-term that indicates the explanation, whereas “A-C” are identical 
with the definiendum, e.g. “eclipse of the moon” is the same as “loss of light from the moon”. 
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theless, if the essence of the attribute is supposed to make the attribute 
what it is, then we encounter familiar problems. For example, if the moon’s 
being screened by the earth explains why the attribute of being eclipsed is 
what it is, and being screened by the earth is (part of) what the attribute is, 
then it seems to follow that the moon’s being screened by the earth explains 
why the moon is screened by the earth. Thus, the explanans is identical with 
the explanandum. Notice that we do not run into similar issues when the 
relevant “why”-question that the essence of the attribute serves to answer is 
taken to be “Why does the attribute belong to a subject?” (rather than 
“Why is the attribute what it is?”). When we ask “Why is the moon 
eclipsed?”, then we are asking why the subject has a certain non-essential 
attribute (rather than asking why the attribute has the sort of essence it 
does). Hence, the explanandum is a non-essential fact about the subject 
which is explained by an essential fact about the attribute, and so the ex-
planandum remains distinct from the explanans.25 
We have been speaking of the essences of attributes. But the causal-
explanatory model is supposed to apply primarily to the essences of sub-
jects. Peramatzis holds that Aristotle extends this model to substance-kinds 
in Metaphysics, whereas Bronstein maintains that he is committed to it al-
ready in Posterior Analytics. On Bronstein’s view, Aristotle’s claim in Poste-
rior Analytics B 1 that “what it is and why it is are the same” (90a 14) ap-
plies also to subject-kinds like moon and human (Bronstein 2016, p. 82). 
Hence, in definitions of subject-kinds (even though they do not have an ex-
plicitly explanatory component), the definiens expresses the essence that 
makes the subject be what it is. For instance, if human is defined as a tame 
two-footed animal, then being a tame two-footed animal makes human the 
very thing that it is. This proposal, too, leaves it unclear what the distinction 
between the explanas and explanandum is supposed to be. In addition, we 
encounter some questions concerning textual evidence. 
As was said before, we can arrive at the definitions of attributes through 
demonstrations specifying the middle term, e.g. knowing what an eclipse of 
the moon is involves knowing what the middle term is that explains why the 
moon is eclipsed. Indeed, Aristotle says in B 1 (89b 36-90a 1) that in seek-
ing what it is and why it is, we are seeking what the middle term is. This 
makes it hard to see how his claim that “what it is and why it is are the 
same” could apply to subjects or substances, since the connection between 
the subject and its essence is immediate and so not mediated by the middle 
 
25 For further discussion, see section 3. 
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term.26 If there were a middle term, then it would be possible to demon-
strate why essential attributes belong to a given subject. If the definitions of 
subjects were demonstrable, then we would be threatened with infinite re-
gress or circularity, both of which Aristotle rejects (see A 3). Bronstein ac-
knowledges that explanations revealed by demonstrations differ from those 
involved in definitions of subject-kinds in that the latter do not specify the 
middle term: “The explanations one grasps in demonstrative scientific 
knowledge are triadic: P belongs to S because of M. The explanations one 
grasps in non-demonstrative scientific knowledge are dyadic: S is the very 
thing that it is because of E” (Bronstein 2016, p. 57). Yet, it does not become 
clear what precisely this distinction amounts to, and how “dyadic” explana-
tions are supposed to work. In particular, it is unclear how the explanans dif-
fers from the explanandum, and how their distinction fits with the idea that 
the connection between the subject and its essential attributes is immediate.27 
We may thus conclude on the basis of what Aristotle says in Topics and 
Posterior Analytics that essence (of the subject or of the attribute) plays an 
explanatory role in the sense that it explains why the subject has certain 
non-essential attributes. For example, human’s being rational explains why 
it is capable of literacy, and moon’s being screened by the earth explains 
why it is eclipsed. However, if we propose that the essence of human or of 
being eclipsed also explains why they are what they are, then we run into 
 
26 Nevertheless, some of Aristotle’s claims might suggest that the search for the middle 
term concerns also subjects or substances. Most notably, at 90a 9-10, he speaks of the middle 
term as “the Į੅ĲȚȠȞ of the substance being not this or that but without qualification”. Barnes 
(2002, p. 48) omits a reference to substance. If we do not omit this, then we face the sort of 
questions discussed in the text and raised already by Ross: “But how can İݧ ݏıĲȚ and Ĳȓ ݋ıĲȚ ap-
plied to a substance be supposed to be concerned with a middle term? A substance does not 
inhere in anything; there are no two terms between which a middle term is to be found” (Ross 
1965, p. 612). See also Goldin 1996, pp. 25-28. Cf. Bronstein 2016, 7.12, who proposes that 
the essence of the subject-kind is the middle term in the sense of explaining why it has other 
necessary attributes. See n. 27. 
27 Bronstein holds that although dyadic explanations involved in knowing definitions 
(“noetic knowledge”) do not make mention of the middle term, demonstrations play a role in 
acquiring this type of knowledge. More specifically, he holds that we learn why the subject-
kind is the very thing that it is by learning why it has the necessary attributes it has. As Bron-
stein says, we acquire demonstrative and noetic knowledge “at the same time and by the same 
activity” (Bronstein 2016, p. 79), i.e. by demonstration. This addresses the sort of worry raised 
by Ross (n. 26), but it also invokes further questions. For one might get the impression that 
dyadic explanations can be reduced to triadic ones: for the essence to make the thing the very 
thing that it is is for it to explain why the thing has the necessary attributes that it has. This 
would get rid of the worry about the explanans and explanandum not being distinct, since a 
thing’s having essential attributes is distinct from its having necessary but non-essential attrib-
utes. However, this would also get rid of the distinction between two types of explanation, 
which presumably isn’t Bronstein’s intention. 
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difficulties. It is not clear how to avoid such difficulties or develop essence-
based explanations about subjects like human from what Aristotle says in 
Posterior Analytics. But he has more to say about such explanations in 
Metaphysics Z 17, which will be the focus of the next section. 
3. The explanatory role of essence in Metaphysics Z 17 
In Metaphysics Z 17, Aristotle makes a “new beginning” (1041a 7) in his 
inquiry into the nature of substance that centers on the idea that “substance 
is a sort of principle and explanation” (Ƞ੝ıȓĮ ਕȡȤ੽ țĮ੿ ĮੁĲȓĮ ĲȚȢ ਥıĲȚȞ, 1041a 
9-10). In Metaphysics Z 17, like in Posterior Analytics, Aristotle is interested 
in explanations based on essences, although here his interests concern more 
specifically the essences of substances and substance-like entities, which are 
taken to be compounds of matter and form. The hylomorphic analysis of 
things like humans and houses marks an important difference between Pos-
terior Analytics and Metaphysics Z 17. The latter relies heavily on the meta-
physical distinction between form and matter, which is absent from Poste-
rior Analytics and from Organon in general. As we will see, Aristotle’s 
commitment to hylomorphism allows him to extend the explanatory 
framework of Posterior Analytics to things like humans and houses. 
Aristotle begins his discussion of explanation in Metaphysics Z 17 by 
linking explanations to “why”-questions that ask why one thing belongs to 
something else: 
The why is always sought in this way: why does one thing belong to something 
else (įȚ੹ Ĳȓ ਙȜȜȠ ਙȜȜ૳ ĲȚȞ੿ ਫ਼ʌȐȡȤİȚ)? For to ask why the musical human is a musical 
human is either to ask, as was just said, why the human is musical, or something 
else. Now, to ask why a thing is itself is to ask nothing (įȚ੹ Ĳȓ Į੝Ĳȩ ਥıĲȚȞ Į੝Ĳȩ, Ƞ੝įȑȞ 
ਥıĲȚ ȗȘĲİ૙Ȟ). For the fact that [something is] and the being [of something] (Ĳઁ ੖ĲȚ 
țĮ੿ Ĳઁ İੇȞĮȚ) must be clear – I mean, for example, that the moon is eclipsed – but 
that a thing is itself is one account and a single explanation that applies to every-
thing (İੈȢ ȜȩȖȠȢ țĮ੿ ȝȓĮ ĮੁĲȓĮ ਥʌ੿ ʌȐȞĲȦȞ), why the human is human, or the musical 
musical […] (1041a 10-18, translations are my own). 
So, to ask why the musical person is a musical person is to ask why the 
person is musical or why the thing is itself. The trouble with the latter ques-
tion is that it asks nothing. Why does Aristotle think that to ask “Why is the 
thing itself?” is to ask nothing at all? He seems to give two reasons: it must 
already be clear that something is itself before we ask why it is itself, and 
there is a single answer to all such questions. Let us begin with the second 
reason. The single answer to the question “Why is the thing itself?” that Ar-
istotle has in mind is presumably “Because it is itself”. Since everything is 
itself, this answer applies to all questions that ask why something is itself, 
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including questions asking why the human is human, or the musical is mu-
sical. If the answer to all such questions is “Because it is itself”, then one 
explanation does not differ from any other. And if one explanation does 
not differ from any other, then we could say that we are inquiring into 
nothing at all. 
The first reason Aristotle gives is less straightforward. He relies also in 
Posterior Analytics on the principle that before we can ask why something is 
thus-and-so it must be clear that it is thus-and-so (see B 1). But why is it 
that asking why the thing is itself, when it is clear that it is itself, amounts to 
asking nothing? The worry seems to be that when we ask “Why is the thing 
itself?” and respond “Because it is itself”, then we cite as an answer the fact 
that must be already evident. However, if the explanans is already evident, 
then what is the point of asking the question in the first place?28 This worry 
emphasizes the circularity of the proposed explanation. If the answer to the 
question “Why is the thing itself?” is that it is itself, then we are dealing 
with a single fact that is already evident to us. Consequently, this explana-
tion fails as a metaphysical explanation, since the explanandum does not dif-
fer from the explanans, and it is not a successful epistemological explana-
tion either, since we do not learn anything we did not already know. 
Aristotle concludes that the appropriate “why”-question, one that is 
conducive to inquiry, should have the following structure: why does some-
thing belong to something else? He points out that in some cases this struc-
ture may not be explicit, as when it is asked “Why is there a human?” 
(1041b 1).29 In these cases, the question should be “articulated out” (1041b 
 
28 See also Bostock 2003, who suggests that if one knows that x exists, then one knows au-
tomatically that x = x, and so “the information that x = x is not extra information, and hence 
requires no explanation” (Bostock 2003, p. 283). 
29 At 1041b 1, I read įȚ੹ Ĳȓ (in: ਙȞșȡȦʌȠȢ įȚ੹ Ĳȓ ਥıĲȚ) with E and Asclepius, rather than Ĳȓ 
(“What is a human?”) with other manuscripts. On this reading, Aristotle is making a point 
about “why”-questions: questions such as “Why is there x?” should be “articulated out” as 
questions of the form “Why does x belong to y?” On the other reading, Aristotle can be un-
derstood as identifying or replacing the question “What is x?” with the question “Why does x 
belong to y?” I do not think much depends on which reading we opt for, but there are good 
reasons to prefer the first one. It fits better with the discussion in Z 17 which focuses on 
“why”-questions, and makes no (other) mention of “what”-questions. It relates to the way the 
example of thunder is presented in Met. Z 17, 1041a 24-25, and the example of eclipse is pre-
sented in An. Post. B 2, 90a 16-17. Aristotle can be seen as specifying that the question “Why 
is there an eclipse?” (įȚ੹ Ĳȓ ਩ıĲȚȞ ਩țȜİȚȥȚȢ) should be “articulated out” as “Why is the moon 
eclipsed?” Moreover, the alternative translation “What is a human?” would relate to the claim 
in An. Post. B 2 that “what it is and why it is are the same” (90a 14). But it is controversial 
whether Aristotle would insist on the same sort of sameness in Met. Z 17. See n. 31. For fur-
ther discussion of this translation, see Lewis 2014, p. 279, n. 18, and Wedin 2005, p. 421, n. 
651. 
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2), so that it will ask why something belongs to something else. Aristotle il-
lustrates the structure of the appropriate “why”-questions with the exam-
ples of thunder, human, and house: 
Thus, one is asking why one thing belongs to another (that it belongs must be 
clear; for if it is not so, then there is no question). For example, why does it thun-
der? Why does noise occur in the clouds? For in this way what is sought is one 
thing [holding] with respect to another. And why are these, e.g. bricks and stones, a 
house? […] Since the being of the thing must already be given, it is clear that the 
question is why the matter is [something], e.g. why are these [bricks and stones] a 
house? Because being for a house (਷Ȟ Ƞੁțȓ઺ İੇȞĮȚ) belongs to/is present in (ਫ਼ʌȐȡȤİȚ) 
them. Why is this, or rather this body in such-and-such a state (ı૵ȝĮ ĲȠ૨ĲȠ ĲȠį੿ 
਩ȤȠȞ), a human? Hence, what is sought is the explanation (Į੅ĲȚȠȞ) – and this is the 
form (İੇįȠȢ) – by which the matter is something (Ĳȓ), and this is substance (Ƞ੝ıȓĮ) 
(1041a 24-b 8). 
As several authors have observed, Aristotle can be understood here as 
extending the explanatory framework developed in Posterior Analytics for 
things like thunder and eclipse to substances or substance-like entities such 
as human or house.30 His discussion in Posterior Analytics B makes it clear 
that to ask why there are things like thunder and eclipse is to ask why they 
belong to a subject. For instance, to ask why there is an eclipse amounts to 
asking why the moon is eclipsed: “Why is there eclipse, or rather why is the 
moon eclipsed?” (90a 16-17). Thus, eclipse is treated as an attribute be-
longing to the moon, which is the appropriate subject for being eclipsed. 
Aristotle holds that answering the question such as “Why is the moon 
eclipsed?” involves finding the middle term that explains why the moon is 
eclipsed, viz. its being screened by the earth.31 
Assuming that “why”-questions about substances and substance-like en-
tities proceed in a similar manner, his examples “human” and “house” 
should be treated as attribute-like entities belonging to a subject. Accord-
ingly, the question “Why is there a human?” should be “articulated out” as 
asking why being human belongs to some subject or why some subject is 
human. What, then, is the appropriate subject in this case? Here we face a 
 
30 See, e.g., Charles 2000, 11.3; Wedin 2005, 10.3; Lewis 2013, 5.11; Ferejohn 2013, 6.5 and 6.6. 
31 In addition, Aristotle holds in An. Post. B 1 that by knowing why the moon is eclipsed, 
we know what eclipse is: we can assemble its definition from the explanation provided by the 
demonstration. It is not clear whether he holds a similar view in Met. Z 17. Charles (2000, 
11.3) proposes that we can give demonstrations involving substances. This proposal is criti-
cized by Wedin (2005, pp. 414-418; 423) and Lewis (2013, pp. 282-287). I side here with 
Wedin and Lewis over Charles. Aristotle makes use of the explanatory framework of Posterior 
Analytics, but this does not mean that explaining why matter is something becomes a matter of 
demonstration in the technical sense of the term. 
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difficulty, since it could not be “human”: to ask “Why is the human hu-
man?” or “Why is the one who is human, human?” (1041a 22) is to ask 
nothing.32 Aristotle’s solution relies on his hylomorphism: matter becomes 
the subject about which we ask why it is something, e.g. human or house. 
As Marc Cohen says, “Aristotle’s importation of matter as the subject for 
his ‘why’ questions seems to be his way of trying to refer to the thing in 
question (e.g., the house or the man) in a logically independent way (i.e., a 
way that doesn’t already imply that the thing is a house or a man…)” 
(Cohen 1978a, pp. 403-404).33 Thus, we should ask “Why is this body in 
such-and-such a state a human?” (1041b 6-7) or “Why are bricks and 
stones a house?” (1041a 26-27), and, in general, “Why is the matter some-
thing (Ĳȓ)?” (1041b 5). The appropriate answer appeals to essence or form. 
For example, the appropriate answer to the question “Why does being a 
house belong to bricks and stones?” is “Because being for a house (its es-
sence) belongs to it”.34 
Before we turn to questions that this answer invokes, it is worth empha-
sizing the similarities between the sort of explanation that Aristotle envis-
ages in Metaphysics Z 17, and explanations of things like eclipse and thun-
der (“things that come about often”) in Posterior Analytics. In both cases 
the explanation proceeds by specifying the third factor that explains why 
the attribute belongs to a subject. Further, what does the immediate ex-
planatory work is the essence of the attribute or however we call that which 
belongs to a subject. For example, what explains why the moon is eclipsed 
is the essence of being eclipsed (not immediately the essence of the 
moon).35 Similarly, what explains why the matter at issue is human or house 
is the essence of being human or house (rather than the essence of matter 
under discussion). Accordingly, the sort of explanation that Aristotle has in 
mind in Z 17 is what Bronstein calls “triadic”: S is F because S is G. 
Among the authors who hold that Aristotle appeals to the explanatory 
framework of Posterior Analytics in his discussion of substances and arti-
 
32 At 1041a 22, Aristotle reformulates the question “Why is human human?” as “Why is 
one who is human, human?” (įȚ੹ Ĳȓ ੖Ȣ ਥıĲȚȞ ਙȞșȡȦʌȠȢ ਙȞșȡȦʌȩȢ ਥıĲȚȞ). This suggests that he 
has in mind a question that asks, of some particular human, why it is human. This can be un-
derstood as asking why this human belongs to the species human, or why it has the attribute of 
being human. Either way, Aristotle treats this as not an appropriate “why”-question to ask. 
33 For a similar proposal, see Lewis 2013, p. 275: “[W]e are to find a new subject for the 
predicate, “man”– a subject non-identical with the thing – the man – with which he began”. 
34 The expression “being for a house” refers to the essence of the house. See Met. Z 4-6, 
where Aristotle uses similar formulae to indicate essence. See also Z 17, 1041a 27-28, where he 
associates Į੅ĲȚȠȞ with essence (Ĳઁ Ĳȓ ਷Ȟ İੇȞĮȚ). 
35 However, it might be that the fuller explanation of the eclipse of the moon would have 
to invoke (among other things) also some essential truths about the moon. See n. 23. 
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facts in Metaphysics Z 17 is also Peramatzis (2011, esp. 7.8). He aims to 
show that form or essence enjoys ontological priority over certain types of 
matter (token- and type-matter constituting token- and type-objects) by ap-
pealing to the explanatory role of form: form makes matter be what it is, 
and it explains why matter has the necessary attributes it has. He says that it 
emerges also from Metaphysics Z 17, 1041b 5-9 that “the cause or principle 
that form or essence is explains the nature and features of matter” and “the 
explanandum [is] the matter and its possession of the essential and neces-
sary features that it has” (Peramatzis 2011, p. 184). This proposal invokes 
two related questions. The first question is predictable. If form or essence 
explains matter’s possession of essential features, then isn’t the proposed 
explanation circular? Aren’t we saying that the matter in question has the 
essential features it has because it has the essential features it has (because 
form or essence is present)? Further, it is not obvious whether Aristotle’s 
discussion in Z 17, 1041b 5-9 would support the proposal that what gets 
explained is matter’s possession of essential features, rather than non-
essential ones. For example, in explaining why the bricks and stones are a 
house, being a house does not seem to be an essential (or necessary) feature 
of bricks and stones, for they could presumably constitute something else 
besides a house. Indeed, if being a house were an essential feature of bricks 
and stones, then we would immediately face worries about circularity. For 
we would be explaining the fact that bricks and stones are essentially a 
house, or, equivalently, that the essence of a house is present in them, by 
appealing to the very same fact.36 These worries can be avoided if the ex-
planandum is matter’s possession of certain non-essential features, which 
are distinct from its essential features. 
Finally, let us consider some questions that the sort of explanation Aris-
totle envisages in Metaphysics Z 17 invokes. Assuming that the essence of 
form figures in an appropriate answer to the question of why the matter is 
something, we may still ask what sort of explanation form is supposed to of-
fer. Does the form explain why the matter has a certain (non-essential) at-
tribute, or why material parts form a unity, or both? The proposal that the 
form explains why material parts form a unity is based on the second half of 
Z 17 (1041b 9-33), where Aristotle argues that there is more to a unified 
 
36 As was indicated in section 1, Peramatzis’ proposal that the explanandum is matter’s 
possession of essential features might be compatible with giving a successful epistemological 
explanation that proceeds in terms of specifying the essence of the essential feature in ques-
tion. For instance, the explanation that bricks and stones constitute a house because they con-
stitute a shelter of some sort, might count as a successful epistemological explanation that in-
creases our understanding. Yet, it would not count as a metaphysical explanation, if being a 
house = shelter of some sort, for in this case we are still dealing with a single fact. 
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whole than the material parts or elements (ıĲȠȚȤİ૙Į) composing it, and this 
“something else” (ਪĲİȡȩȞ ĲȚ) is neither an element nor composed of ele-
ments. This argument is often taken to establish that the essence or form of 
a unified whole (a matter-form compound) is the Į੅ĲȚȠȞ of its unity.37 Ac-
cordingly, one might propose that by explaining why matter is something, 
the form explains why material parts constitute a unified thing. Alterna-
tively, one might concede that the form explains why material parts form a 
unity, but deny that this amounts to explaining why the matter is some-
thing.38 Instead, the form explains both why the matter is something and 
why the material parts constitute a unified whole.39 It is not my aim to settle 
this issue here, but to point out that there are various interpretive options. 
These options do not challenge the plausibility of the sort of explanations 
that Aristotle envisages in Z 17, but bring to light some further questions 
about the explanatory role of forms. 
Further, to defend Aristotle’s proposed explanations, one should be 
able to account for the distinction (i) between matter and its being some-
thing; (ii) between matter and form; and (iii) between matter’s being some-
thing and form’s being present in it. The first distinction is important be-
cause the “why”-question conducive to inquiry should ask why one thing 
belongs to another, not why the thing is itself. Aristotle seems to have this 
in mind when he posits matter as the subject about which we ask why it is 
something. Even though Aristotle clearly assumes the distinction between 
matter and its being something, we might want to know more about the na-
ture of this distinction.40 The second distinction is important because the 
explanans of the proposed explanation involves the form or essence. If mat-
ter does not differ from form or is part of it, then we face the charge of cir-
cularity: the explanandum (e.g. some suitable matter that is human) is in-
cluded in the explanans (e.g. the essence of being human).41 The third dis-
 
37 See Wedin 2005, esp. 10.5. Cf. Koslicki 2014, p. 125, who calls it “a unity claim”, and 
emphasizes that this is not the only goal of Aristotle’s argument in the second half of Z 17. 
38 For this proposal, see Menn 2001, p. 131. 
39 A version of this view is defended by Witt: “[I]ts form or essence is responsible for the 
matter constituting a unified determinate being, rather than a heap” (Witt 1989, p. 120). 
40 I have presented the distinction as one between the subject and that which belongs to a 
subject, in much the same manner as eclipse or thunder are attributes belonging to their sub-
jects. See also Koslicki 2014, pp. 122-126, who reads Aristotle’s argument in the second half of 
Met. Z 17 as trying to establish that a thing (a unified whole) and its matter are distinct. 
41 This worry seems to motivate Wedin’s view on the “purity of form”, viz. that “if form is 
to explain why certain material parts are such-and-such, then form itself cannot contain mat-
ter” (Wedin 2005, p. 450). Cf. Peramatzis 2011, ch. 7, who defends the view that form has cer-
tain material features (so matter of some sort is part of what form is), but these material fea-
tures are distinct from the token- and type-matter that constitute token-and type-objects. 
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tinction is important because if the matter’s being something is not distinct 
from the form’s being present in it, then we face the same sort of problems 
that we have discussed in connection with the scholarly attempt to explicate 
the explanatory role of essence in terms of “making the thing be what it is”. 
Here I will address the last worry, which is most important for our pur-
poses, since it might suggest that Aristotle himself is vulnerable to problems 
we have outlined in connection with Bronstein’s and Peramatzis’ accounts. 
It should be pointed out that a similar worry can be raised also in con-
nection with Aristotle’s examples of eclipse and thunder in Posterior Ana-
lytics. As was proposed above, the explanations in Metaphysics Z 17 are 
similar to explanations involving eclipse and thunder, in that what does the 
immediate explaining is the essence of the attribute, rather than the essence 
of the subject. For example, what explains why the moon is eclipsed is its 
being screened by the earth, which is part of what being eclipsed is. Ac-
cordingly, one might worry that when we ask why the moon is eclipsed, 
then we are asking why the moon is being screened by the earth, given that 
being screened by the earth is what being eclipsed is. Aren’t we dealing 
here with a single fact (viz. the moon’s being screened by the earth), rather 
than with two distinct facts, one of which explains the other? Similarly, 
when we ask why the matter at issue is human or house, then aren’t we ask-
ing why the essence of being a human or a house is present in it? 
Admittedly, there is some tension here, but this can be alleviated by 
specifying what precisely are the explanandum and the explanans. What is 
explained here is not an essential fact about the attribute (why the attribute 
is what it is), but rather a non-essential fact about the subject (why a certain 
non-essential attribute belongs to a subject).42 For example, when the moon’s 
being eclipsed is explained by the moon’s being screened by the earth, then 
the explanandum is a non-essential fact about the moon (being eclipsed is not 
essential to being a moon), while the explanans is an essential fact about the 
attribute of being eclipsed (being screened by the earth is essential to being 
eclipsed). Similarly, in explaining why bricks and stones are a house, we are 
not explaining an essential fact about bricks and stones, but a non-essential 
fact about them, assuming that being a house is not essential for their being 
the sort of materials they are. What explains why bricks and stones are a 
house is the presence of the essence of being a house (“being for a house”, 
e.g. being a shelter of some sort). Thus, we appeal to an essential fact about 
 
42 In this respect, these explanations do not differ from those where the essence of the sub-
ject does the explanatory work. For example, when explaining why a triangle has 2R from the 
essence of a triangle, we are explaining why a certain non-essential attribute belongs to a sub-
ject. 
RIIN SIRKEL 110 
the attribute to explain a non-essential fact about the subject. Consequently, 
the fact that explains remains distinct from the fact that is explained, and so 
we are dealing here with a genuine metaphysical explanation.43 
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